Abstract. We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty:
Introduction
We consider a Stable Marriage problem (SM) in which there is a set of men and a set of women. Each man has a linear order over the women, and each woman has a linear order over the men. For the purpose of this paper we assume that the preference lists are complete, i.e., each agent finds each member of the opposite side acceptable. 6 In the stable marriage problem the goal is to compute a stable matching; a matching where no two agents prefer to be matched to each other rather than be matched to their current partners. Unlike most of the literature on stable matching problems [6, 11, 14] , we assume that men and women may have uncertainty in their preferences which can be captured by various probabilistic uncertainty models. We focus on linear models in which each possible deterministic preference profile is a set of linear orders.
Uncertainty in preferences could arise for a number of reasons both practical or epistemological. For example, an agent could express a weak order because the agent did not invest enough time or effort to differentiate between potential matches and therefore one could assume that each linear extension of the weak order is equally likely; this maps to our compact indifference model. In many real applications the ties are broken randomly with lotteries, e.g., in the school choice programs in New York and Boston as well as in centralized college admissions in Ireland. However, a central planner may also choose a matching that is optimal in some sense, without breaking the ties in the preference list. For instance, in Scotland they used to compute the maximum size (weakly) stable matching to allocate residents to hospitals [11] . We argue that another natural solution could be the matching which has the highest probability of being stable after conducting a lottery. Alternatively, there may be a cost associated with eliciting preferences from the agents, so a central planner may want to only obtain and provide a recommendation based on a subset of the complete orders [2] .
As another example, imagine a group of interns are admitted to a company and allocated to different projects based on their preferences and the preferences of the project leaders. Suppose that after three months the interns can switch projects if the project leaders agree; though the company would prefer not to have swaps if possible. However, both the interns and the project leaders can have better information about each other after the three months, and the assignment should also be stable with regard to the refined preferences. This example motivates our lottery and joint probability models. In the lottery model, the agents have independent probabilities over possible linear orders (e.g. each project leader has a probability distribution on possible refined rankings over the interns independently from each other). In the joint probability model, the probability distribution is over possible preference profiles and can thus accommodate the possibility that the preferences of the agents are refined in a correlated way (e.g. if an intern performs well in the first three months then she is likely to be highly ranked by all project leaders). Uncertainty in preferences has already been studied in voting [8] and for cooperative games [10] . Ehlers and Massó [3] considers many-to-one matching markets under a Bayesian setting. Similarly, in auction theory, it is standard to examine Bayesian settings in which there is a probability distribution over the types of agents.
To illustrate the problem we describe a simple example with four agents. We write b ≻ a c to say that agent a prefers b to c and assume the lottery model. Example 1. We have two men m 1 and m 2 and two women w 1 and w 2 . Each agent assigns a probability to each strict preference ordering as follows. (i) p(w 1 ≻ m1 w 2 ) = 0.4 and p(w 2 ≻ m1 w 1 ) = 0.6 (ii) p(w 1 ≻ m2 w 2 ) = 0.0 and p(w 2 ≻ m2 w 1 ) = 1.0 (iii) p(m 1 ≻ w1 m 2 ) = 1.0 and p(m 2 ≻ w1 m 1 ) = 0.0 (iv) p(m 1 ≻ w2 m 2 ) = 0.8 and p(m 2 ≻ w2 m 1 ) = 0.2. This setting admits two match-ings that are stable with positive probability: µ 1 = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 )} and µ 2 = {(m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 )}. Notice that if each agent submits the preference list that s/he finds most likely to be true, then the setting admits a unique stable matching that is µ 2 . The probability of µ 2 being stable, however, is 0.48 whereas the probability of µ 1 being stable is 0.52.
Uncertainty Models
We consider three different uncertainty models: -Lottery Model: For each agent, we are given a probability distribution over strict preference lists. -Compact Indifference Model: Each agent reports a single weak preference list that allows for ties. Each complete linear order extension of this weak order is assumed to be equally likely. -Joint Probability Model: A probability distribution over preference profiles is specified.
Note that for the Lottery Model and the Joint Probability Model the representation of the input preferences can be exponentially large. However, in settings where similar models of uncertainty are used, including resident matching [2] and voting [8] , a limited amount of uncertainty (i.e. small supports) is commonly expected and observed in real world data. Consequently, we consider special cases when the uncertainty is bounded in certain natural ways including the existence of only a small number of uncertain preferences and/or uncertainty on only one side of the market.
Observe that the compact indifference model can be represented as a lottery model. This is a special case of the lottery model in which each agent expresses a weak order over the candidates (similar to the SMT setting [6, 11] ). However, the lottery model representation can be exponentially larger than the compact indifference model; for an agent that is indifferent among n agents on the other side of the market, there are n! possible linearly ordered preferences.
Computational Problems
Given a stable marriage setting where agents have uncertain preferences, various natural computational problems arise. Let stability probability denote the probability that a matching is stable. We then consider the following two natural problems for each of our uncertainty models.
-MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability: Given uncertain preferences of the agents, compute a matching with the highest stability probability. We also consider two specific problems that are simpler than StabilityProbability: (1) IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero -For a given matching, is its stability probability non-zero? (2) IsStabilityProbabilityOne -For a given matching, is its stability probability one?
We additionally consider problems connected to, and more restricted than, MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability: (1) ExistsCertainlyStableMatching -Does there exist a matching that has stability probability one? (2) ExistsPossiblyStableMatching -Does there exist a matching that has non-zero stability probability?
Note that ExistsPossiblyStableMatching is straightforward to answer for any of the three uncertainty models we consider here, since there exists a stable matching for each deterministic preference profile that is a possible realization of the uncertain preferences. Table 1 summarizes our main findings. Note that the complexity of each problem is considered with respect to the input size, and that under the lottery and joint probability models the size of the input could be exponential in n, namely O(n! · 2n) for the lottery model and O((n!) 2n ) for the joint probability model, where n is the number of agents on either side of the market.
Results
We point out that StabilityProbability is #P-complete for the lottery model even when each agent has at most two possible preferences, but in P if one side has certain preferences. Additionally, we show that IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero is in P for the lottery model if each agent has at most two possible preferences. Note that StabilityProbability is open for the compact indifference model when both sides may be uncertain, and we also do not know the complexity of MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbility in the lottery model, except when only a constant number of agents are uncertain on the same side of the market.
Preliminaries
In the Stable Marriage problem, there are two sets of agents. Let M denote a set of n men and W a set of n women. We use the term agents when making statements that apply to both men and women, and the term candidates to refer to the agents on the opposite side of the market to that of an agent under consideration. Each agent has a linearly ordered preference over the candidates. An agent may be uncertain about his/her linear preference ordering. Let L denote the uncertain preference profile for all agents. We denote by I = (M, W, L) an instance of a Stable Marriage problem with Uncertain Linear Preferences (SMULP).
We say that a given uncertainty model is independent if any uncertain preference profile L under the model can be written as a product of uncertain preferences L a for all agents a, where all L a 's are independent. Note that the lottery and the compact indifference models are both independent, but the joint probability model is not.
A matching µ is a pairing of men and women such that each man is paired with at most one woman and vice versa; defining a list of (man, woman) pairs (m, w). We use µ(m) to denote the woman w that is matched to m and µ(w) to denote the match for w. Given linearly ordered preferences, a matching is stable if there is no pair (m, w) not in µ where m prefers w to his current partner in µ, i.e., w ≻ m µ(m), and vice versa. If such a pair exists, it constitutes a blocking pair ; as the pair would prefer to defect and match with each other rather than stay with their partner in µ. Given an instance of SMULP, a matching is certainly stable if it is stable with probability 1.
The following extensions of SM will come in handy in proving our results. The Stable Marriage problem with Partially ordered lists (SMP) is an extension of SM in which agents' preferences are partial orders over the candidates. The Stable Marriage problem with Ties (SMT) is a special case of SMP in which incomparability is transitive and is interpreted as indifference. Therefore, in SMT each agent partitions the candidates into different ties (equivalence classes), is indifferent between the candidates in the same tie, and has strict preference ordering over the ties. In some practical settings some agents may find some candidates unacceptable and prefer to remain unmatched than to get matched to the unacceptable ones. SMP with Incomplete lists (SMPI) and SMT with Incomplete lists (SMTI) captures these scenarios where each agent's partially ordered list contains only his/her acceptable candidates. A matching is superstable in an instance of SMPI if it is stable w.r.t. all linear extensions of the partially ordered lists.
We define the certainly preferred relation ≻ m}. Based on the notion of the dominance relation, we present a useful characterization of certainly stable matchings for independent uncertainty models. Proof. Assume that there exists a pair {m, w} such that µ(m) / ∈ D m (w) or µ(w) / ∈ D w (m). Then, m has non-zero probability of preferring w over µ(m) and w has non-zero probability of preferring m over µ(w). But this means that µ has non-zero probability of not being stable.
Assume that a matching µ is certainly stable. Then no blocking pair {m, w} has non-zero probability of forming. This is only possible if the pair {m, w} is part of the matching or one of m and w have zero probability of preferring the blocking {m, w} over their current match in µ. In either case,
We point out that certainly preferred relation can be computed in polynomial time for all three models studied in this paper. Certainly stable matchings are closely related to the notion of super-stable matchings [5, 9] . In fact we can define a certainly stable matching using a terminology similar to that of super-stability. Given a matching µ and an unmatched pair {m, w}, we say that {m, w} very weakly blocks (blocks) µ if µ(m) ≻ 
General Results
In this section, we first show that the complexity of all problems that we study are the same for complete and incomplete lists. We then present some general results that apply to multiple uncertainty models. We show that ExistsCertainlyStableMatching can be solved in polynomial time for any independent uncertainty model including lottery and compact indifference. We then prove that, when the number of uncertain agents is constant and one side of the market is certain, we can solve MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability efficiently for each of the linear models.
The Case for Incomplete Lists
The next proposition explains that our efficient algorithms described for the case of complete lists can be extended to incomplete lists. Additionally, our hardness proofs for incomplete lists can be transformed for complete lists. In fact, all our hardness reductions, except Theorem 9, are for complete lists so they trivially extend to the case of incomplete lists.
Proposition 2. The complexity of each computational problem studied in this paper are the same for complete and incomplete lists. Formally, if I is a linear model with incomplete lists then we can construct an instance I ′ with complete lists such that for each matching µ in I there exists a corresponding matching µ ′ in I ′ with p(µ, I) = p(µ ′ , I ′ ), such that µ can be obtained from µ ′ in polynomial time. Furthermore, µ is one of the most stable matchings in I if and only if the corresponding matching µ ′ is one of the most stable matching in I ′ . Therefore a polynomial time algorithm solving StabilityProbability or MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability for complete lists can be used to solve the same problem for incomplete lists in polynomial time.
Proof. In the case of complete lists we assumed that we have an equal number of men and women and everybody finds all candidates acceptable. When we consider the problem with incomplete lists we mean that the sizes of the two sets are not necessarily the same and not all the candidates are acceptable for the agents. However, we assume that in all realization of the preference profiles the same candidates are acceptable, so we only randomize on the preferences over the acceptable partners. Suppose that I is an instance of a probabilistic model with incomplete lists with sets M and W . Let us create the corresponding instance I ′ with sets M ′ and W ′ in the following way. First we ensure that |M ′ | = |W ′ | by adding enough agents to the short side of the market. Then we complete the preference lists of each agent by adding the previously unacceptable candidates to the end of her/his list according to a predetermined order, e.g. by the indices of the agents. Suppose now that µ is a matching in I and X is the set of matched men in M , whilst µ(X) = Y . Let us create a corresponding matching µ ′ in I ′ by extending µ with the unique stable matching for the subinstance restricted to the unmatched agents. Namely, let µ u be the stable matching that matches M ′ \ X to W ′ \ Y in such a way that the kth pair contains the kth man and the kth woman from M ′ \ X and W ′ \ Y , respectively according to their indices, and let µ ′ = µ ∪ µ u . Now we claim that p(µ, I) = p(µ ′ , I ′ ). This is because there is no blocking pair in (
, and any other pair is blocking for some preference profile in I if and only if it is blocking for the corresponding preference profile in I ′ , obviously. Furthermore, it is also clear that among the extensions of µ, µ ′ is the most stable one in I ′ . Therefore µ is one of the most stable matchings in I if and only if the corresponding extension, µ ′ is one of the most stable matchings in I ′ . Thus an efficient algorithm for StabilityProbability or MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability (or other subproblems) for complete lists can also be used to solve the same problems for the case of incomplete lists. This also implies that any hardness result proved for incomplete lists holds also for complete lists. ⊓ ⊔
An Algorithm for the Lottery and Compact Indifference Models
Theorem 1. For any independent uncertainty model in which the certainly preferred relation is transitive and can be computed in polynomial time, ExistsCertainlyStableMatching can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. We prove this by reducing ExistsCertainlyStableMatching to the problem of deciding whether an instance of SMP admits a super-stable matching or not. The latter problem can be solved in polynomial time using algorithm SUPER-SMP in [13] . Let I = (M, W, L) be an instance of ExistsCertainlyStableMatching under an independent uncertainty model, assuming that the certainly preferred relation is transitive and can be computed in polynomial time. We construct an instance I ′ = (M, W, p) of SMP, in polynomial time, as follows. The set of men and women are unchanged. To create the partial preference ordering p a for each agent a we do the following. W.l.o.g. assume that a is a man m. For every pair of women w 1 and Proof. Let I = (M, W, L) be an instance of MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability and let X ⊆ M be the set of uncertain agents with |X| = k for a constant k. We consider all the possible matchings between X and W , where their total number is K = n(n − 1) . . . (n − k). Let µ i be such a matching for i ∈ {1 . . . K}. The main idea of the proof is to show that there exist an extension of µ i to M ∪ W that has stability probability at least as high as any other extension of µ i . In this way we will need to compute this probability for only a polynomial number of matchings in n, that we can do efficiently for each model, and then compare them and select the one with the highest probability. So we take a matching µ i between sets X and W . Let Y = µ i (X) (i.e., the partners of X in W ) and let M ′ = M \ X and W ′ = W \ Y . First, we compute the man-optimal matching µ M i for the sub-instance I ′ on M ′ ∪ W ′ , that can be done efficiently by the Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] .
Suppose now that there is no blocking pair of the form {m ′ , w}, as explained above, for µ Finally, we will show that for any matching µ ′ i , that is an extension of µ i to I, the stability probability of µ ′ i is less than, or equal to, the stability probability of µ * i . If µ ′ i is not stable for the certain agents then µ ′ i has zero probability of being stable, thus the statement holds. If µ ′ i is stable for the certain agents then it must also be stable in I r i , and each woman in W ′ weakly prefers her partner in µ * i to her partner in µ ′ i , since she gets her optimal stable partner for I r i in µ * i . Therefore, if µ ′ i is stable under a preference profile then µ * i will also be stable, so the statement follows. Thus, there remain only a polynomial number (K) of candidate matchings in n for which we have to compute the probabilities. StabilityProbability is polynomial-time solvable for all the three models we consider given that one side has certain preferences, as described in Theorems 3, 8, and 10.
⊓ ⊔
Lottery Model
In this section we focus on the lottery model. Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that men have certain preferences. The following procedure gives us the stability probability of µ for any given µ.
(1) For each uncertain woman w identify those preferences that allow her not to form a blocking pair. We can do this in polynomial time as men have strict preferences and therefore for each preference ordering of w we only need to look up the (one and only) preference ordering of each m who w prefers to µ(w). Proof. The problem is equivalent to checking whether the given matching µ has non-zero probability of not being stable. This can be checked as follows. For each possible pair of agents {m, w} that are not matched to each other, we check whether they can form a blocking pair with non-zero probability. For this, we just need to check whether m prefers w in some possible preference over µ(m) and whether w prefers m in some possible preference over µ(w). ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 5. For the lottery model, IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero is polynomial-time solvable when each agent has at most two possible preference orderings.
Proof. The problem is to decide whether there is some preference ordering for each agent (among the ones in their lottery) such that the given matching is stable. If each agent has at most two possible preference orderings in their lottery, we can reduce the problem to an instance ϕ of 2SAT, as follows. Let {a 1 , . . . , a n } and {b 1 , . . . , b n } be the two sets of agents. Moreover, for each agent c and each i ∈ {1, 2}, let pref(c, i) denote the i-th preference in the lottery for agent c.
We introduce a propositional variable for each preference pref(c, i)-which we also call pref(c, i). Intuitively, these variables indicate which preference for the agents we choose to make the matching stable.
For each agent c, we add the following clauses to ϕ, to ensure that for each agent c there is exactly one preference that is selected: (pref(c, 1)∨pref(c, 2)) ∧ (¬pref(c, 1) ∨ ¬pref(c, 2)).
Then, we add clauses to ensure that the selected matching is stable. For each agent c and each i ∈ {1, 2}, let B c,i be the set of preferences pref(c ′ , i ′ )-for c ′ = c and i ′ ∈ {1, 2}-such that pref(c, i) and pref(c ′ , i ′ ) together lead to the given matching being unstable (with (c, c ′ ) being a blocking pair). Then, for each c, i, we add the following clauses: (¬pref(c, i) ∨ ¬pref(c ′ , i ′ )) for each pref(c ′ , i ′ ) ∈ B c,i . The given matching is then stable if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Since ϕ is a 2CNF, this can be decided in linear time.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 6. For the lottery model, StabilityProbability is #P-complete, even when each agent has at most two possible preferences.
Proof. We show how to count the number of satisfying assignments for a 2CNF formula using the problem StabilityProbability for the lottery model where each agent has two possible preferences. Since this problem is #P-hard, we get #P-hardness also for StabilityProbability. Let ϕ be a 2CNF formula over the variables x 1 , . . . , x n . We firstly transform ϕ to a 2CNF formula ϕ ′ over the variables x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n that has exactly the same number of satisfying assignments, and that satisfies the property that each clause contains one variable among x 1 , . . . , x n and one variable among y 1 , . . . , y n . We do so as follows. Firstly, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we add the clauses (¬x i ∨ y i ) and (¬y i ∨ x i ), ensuring that in each satisfying assignment the variables x i and y i get assigned the same truth value. Then, for each clause of ϕ, we replace one occurrence of a variable among x 1 , . . . , x n by the corresponding variable among y 1 , . . . , y n , and we add the resulting clause to ϕ ′ . For example, if ϕ contains the clause (x 1 ∨ ¬x 3 ), we would add the clause (x 1 ∨ ¬y 3 ) to ϕ ′ . It is readily verified that ϕ ′ has the same number of satisfying assignments as ϕ. Moreover, we may assume without loss of generality that for any two variables of ϕ ′ , there is at most one clause of ϕ ′ that contains both of these variables. If in ϕ there are two variables x 1 and x 2 and clauses (x 1 ∨ x 2 ) and (¬x 1 ∨ ¬x 2 ), for instance, we can construct ϕ ′ to contain the clauses (x 1 ∨ y 2 ) and (¬y 1 ∨ ¬x 2 ). We now construct an instance of StabilityProbability. The sets of agents that we consider are {x 1 , . . . , x n , a 1 , . . . , a n } and {y 1 , . . . , y n , b 1 , . . . , b n }. The matching that we consider matches x i to b i and matches y i to a i , for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This is depicted below. Each agent b i has only a single possible preference, namely one where they prefer x i over all other agents. Similarly, each agent a i has a single possible preference where they prefer y i over all other agents. In other words, the agents a i and b i are perfectly happy with the given matching. The agents x i and y i each have two possible preferences, that are each chosen
• an with probability 1 2 . These two possible preferences are associated with setting these variables to true or false, respectively. We describe how these preferences are constructed for the agents x i . The construction for the preferences of the agents y i is then entirely analogous.
Take an arbitrary agent x i . We show how to construct the two possible preferences for agent x i , which we denote by p xi and p ¬xi . Both of these possible preferences are based on the following partial ranking: b 1 > b 2 > · · · > b n , and we add some of the agents y 1 , . . . , y n to the top of this partial ranking, and the remaining agents to the bottom of this partial ranking.
To the ranking p xi we add exactly those agents y j to the top where ϕ ′ contains a clause (¬x i ∨ y j ) or a clause (¬x i ∨ ¬y j ). All remaining agents we add to the bottom. Similarly, to the ranking p ¬xi we add exactly those agents y j to the top where ϕ ′ contains a clause (x i ∨ y j ) or a clause (x i ∨ ¬y j ). The rankings p yi and p ¬yi , for the agents y i , are constructed entirely similarly. Now consider a truth assignment α : {x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n } → {0, 1}, and consider the corresponding choice of preferences for the agents x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n , where for each agent x i the preference p xi is chosen if and only if α(x i ) = 1, and for each agent y i the preference p yi is chosen if and only if α(y i ) = 1. Then α satisfies ϕ ′ if and only if the corresponding choice of preferences leads to the matching being stable. Since each combination of preferences is equally likely to occur, and there are 2 2n many combinations of preferences, the probability that the given matching is stable is exactly q = s 2 2n , where s is the number of satisfying truth assignments for ϕ. Therefore, given q, s can be obtained by computing s = q2 2n .
⊓ ⊔
If each agent is allowed to have three possible preferences, then even the following problem is NP-complete. The statement can be proved via a reduction from Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C).
Theorem 7. For the lottery model, IsStabilityProbabilityNon-Zero is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in NP, since we only need to provide one profile that occurs with non-zero probability for which the given matching is stable. We show NPhardness by giving a reduction from Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C). Let (X, C) be an instance of X3C, where |X| = 3n for some n, and C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is a collection of sets c i ⊆ X, each of size 3. Moreover, let c i = {x ℓi,1 , x ℓi,2 , x ℓi,3 }, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The problem is to decide whether there is a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size exactly n such that C ′ = X. We construct an instance of our problem as follows. We let {a 1 , . . . , a n , a • a1
• b1 Then, for each agent b i , we add the following |C| possible preferences to the lottery:
where in each preference the remaining agents appear in any (fixed) order after a i . In other words, b i prefers three agents a ′ j to their current match, and these three form some set c ∈ C.
Finally, for each agent a ′ j , we add the following n possible preferences to the lottery:
That is, each agent a ′ j prefers each of the agents b 1 , . . . , b n , except one, to their current match (and they never prefer any of the agents b ′ j ′ for j ′ = j over their current match).
We can show that there is a choice of preferences for the agents that makes this matching stable if and only if (X, C) ∈ X3C.
(⇒) Firstly, suppose that there is a choice of preferences for the agents that makes this matching stable. That is, for each agent b i there is some preference ordering P i,ℓi , and for each agent a ′ j there is some preference ordering P ′ j,kj , such that these orderings (together with the fixed preference orderings for the agents a i and b ′ j ) make this matching stable. Now, consider the set
To derive a contradiction, suppose that this is not the case, that is, suppose that C ′ = X. Then, since |C ′ | = n, |X| = 3n and for each c ∈ C ′ it holds that |c| = 3, we know that there must be some c ℓ , c ℓ ′ ∈ C ′ such that c ℓ ∩ c ℓ ′ = ∅. Say that x j ∈ c ℓ ∩ c ℓ ′ . Therefore, there must be some i, i ′ ∈ [n] such that both b i and b i ′ prefer a ′ j over their current match. On the other hand, a ′ j will prefer either b i or b i ′ over their current match. Therefore, either b i and a ′ j or b i ′ and a ′ j will form a blocking pair. Thus, the matching is not stable. From this we can conclude that C ′ = X.
(⇐) Conversely, suppose that there exists some C ′ ⊆ C of size exactly n such that C ′ = X. Let C ′ = {c ℓ1 , . . . , c ℓn }. Now, for each agent b i we pick some preference ordering, and for each agent a ′ j we pick some preference ordering, such that these orderings (together with the fixed preference orderings for the agents a i and b ′ j ) make the matching stable. For each agent b i , we pick the preference ordering P i,ℓi , and for each agent a ′ j we pick the preference ordering P ′ j,kj , where k j ∈ [n] is the unique value such that x j ∈ c ℓ k j . It is straightforward to verify that these preferences make the matching stable.
We obtain the first corollary from Theorem 7 and the second from [16, Proposition 8] and Theorem 7.
Corollary 1. For the lottery model, unless P = NP, there exists no polynomialtime algorithm for approximating StabilityProbability of a given matching.
Corollary 2. For the lottery model, unless NP = RP, there is no FPRAS for StabilityProbability.
Compact Indifference Model
The compact indifference model is equivalent to assuming that we are given an instance of SMT and each linear order over candidates (each possible preference ordering) is achieved by breaking ties independently at random with uniform probabilities. It is easy to show that IsStabilityProbablityNonZero, IsStabilityProbablityOne, and ExistsCertainlyStableMatching are all in P.
Proposition 3.
For the compact indifference model, IsStabilityProbabilityNonZero is in P.
Proof. This is equivalent to checking whether a given matching µ is weakly stable in the given SMTI instance. To check this we only have to look for a blocking pair, which can be done in polynomial time: take every possible pair (m, w) who are not matched together and check whether they both strictly prefer each other to their current partner.
⊓ ⊔ Proposition 4. For the compact indifference model, IsStabilityProbabilityOne is in P.
Proof. The problem is polynomial-time solvable. We go through all the blocking pairs and check if any blocking pair is feasible. For each blocking pair, we break ties (if there are any) in favour of the blocking pair. Given that we break ties in favour of the blocking pairs, if there exists a blocking pair that is feasible, the stability probability is not one. ⊓ ⊔ Proposition 5. For the compact indifference model, ExistsCertainlyStableMatching is in P.
Proof. Deciding whether there is matching that is stable with probability one is equivalent to deciding whether there is a matching that is stable w.r.t. all refinements, a super-stable matching. Given an instance of SMTI one can decide in polynomial time whether it admits a super-stable matching or not [12] .
We do not yet know the complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching under the compact indifference model, but this problem can be shown to be in P if one side has certain preferences.
Theorem 8.
In the compact indifference model, if one side has certain preferences, StabilityProbability is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Assume, w.l.o.g., that men have certain preferences. The following procedure gives us the stability probability of any given matching µ. (1) For each uncertain woman w identify those men with whom she can potentially form a blocking pair. That is, those m such that w≻ m µ(m) and w is indifferent between m and her partner in µ. Assume there are k of such men. The probability of w not forming a blocking pair with any men is then 1 k+1 . (2) Multiply the probabilities from step 1.
⊓ ⊔
We next show that MatchingWithHighestStabilityProbability is NPhard. For an instance I of SMT and matching µ, let p(µ, I) denote the probability of µ being stable, and let p S (I) = max{p(µ, I)|µ is a matching in I}, that is the maximum probability of a matching being stable. A matching µ is said to be weakly stable if there exists a tie-breaking rule where µ is stable. Therefore a matching µ has positive probability of being stable if and only if it is weakly stable. Furthermore, if the number of possible tie-breaking is N then any weakly stable matching has a probability of being stable at least
1
N . An extreme case occurs if we have one woman only with n men, where the woman is indifferent between all men. In this case any matching (pair) has a 1 n probability of being stable. An even more unfortunate scenario is when we have n men and n women, each women is indifferent between all men, and each man ranks the women in a strict order in the same way, e.g. in the order of their indices. In this case, the probability that the first woman picks her best partner, and thus does not block any matching is 1 n . Suppose that the first woman picked her best partner, the probability that the second woman also picks her best partner from the remaining n − 1 men is 1 n−1 , and so on. Therefore, the probability that an arbitrary complete matching is stable is Proof. For an instance I of SMTI, let opt(I) denote the maximum size of a weakly stable matching in I. Halldorsson et al. [7] showed [in the proof of Corollary 3.4] that given an instance I of SMTI of size n, where only one side of the market has agents with indifferences and each of these agents has a single tie of size two, and any arbitrary small positive ǫ, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases: (1) Let each z j ∈ Z has y j as first choice and then all the men Y j in one tie of size n. Each man in Y j has only z j in his list. We will show that in case one
. Therefore, for n > 2 27 , it is NP-hard to decide which of the two separate intervals contains the value p S (I ′ ). To show the above statement, suppose first that we have the first case, so opt(I) > 41 54 n and therefore less than 13 54 n women are left unmatched in a maximum size weakly stable matching µ for I, denoted by W u ⊂ W . We extend µ to µ ′ for I ′ as follows. We assign all the women in W u to men in X in the unique stable way, namely we pair them in a mutually increasing order of their indices. Since |X| > |W u |, we now matched all women in W , and left some men in X unmatched in µ ′ . We complete the matching by assigning y j to z j for each j = 1, . . . , n and leaving all of the men in Y j for all j unmatched. We shall see that no matter how we break the ties in I ′ , blocking pair can appear between the original I agents only, and therefore the probability of µ ′ being stable in I ′ is the same as the probability of µ being stable in I. Since we have at most n ties in I, each of length two, the number of different tie-breakings is at most 2 n , out of which at least one is stable. Therefore p(µ, I ′ ) = p(µ, I) ≥ 1 2 n . In the second case, opt(I) < 39 54 n and therefore more than 15 54 n women are left unmatched in any weakly stable matching µ for I. Let µ ′ be one of the most stable matchings in I ′ . First we have to note that the restriction of µ ′ to I must be weakly stable in I, since otherwise p(µ ′ , I ′ ) = 0. Let W u denote the set of women that are not matched to any man from M in µ ′ . According to our assumption |W u | > 15 54 n, whilst |X| + |Y | = 15 54 n, therefore in order to avoid a certain blocking pair between W u and X ∪Y we shall match all the men in X ∪Y to women in W u in the only stable way (in the order of indices, where men in X are coming before men in Y ), an leaving some women in W u unmatched in µ ′ . However, in this case no agent z j ∈ Z can be matched to y j , and therefore, even if there was no potential blocking pair between agents of I, the probability that z j is matched the best partner from Y j is 1 n independently for each z j ∈ Z.
Therefore the probability of µ ′ being stable is at most (
, which completes the proof of the first statement.
Regarding the NP-hardness of finding one of the most stable matchings, we shall prove that we can decide between the two cases according to the number of unmatched women in W in the restriction of µ ′ to I, where µ ′ is one of the most stable matchings in I ′ . To see this, let W u denote again the set of women that are not matched to any man in M under µ ′ . In the first case, when opt(I) > 41 54 n, it must be the case that |W u | < 15 54 n, since otherwise p(µ ′ , I) would be less than ( 1 n ) n 27 and could not achieve 
Joint Probability Model
In this section, we examine problems concerning the joint probability model.
Theorem 10.
For the joint probability model, StabilityProbability can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. The probability that a given matching is stable is equivalent to the probability weight of the preference profiles for which the matching is stable. This can be checked as follows. We check the preference profiles for which the given matching is stable (for one profile, this can be checked in O(n 2 )). Then we add the probabilities of those profiles for which the matching is stable. The sum of the probabilities is the probability that the matching is stable. ⊓ ⊔ Corollary 3. For the joint probability model, IsStabilityProbabilityNonZero and IsStabilityProbabilityOne can be solved in polynomial time.
For the joint probability model, the problem ExistsCertainlyStableMatching is equivalent to checking whether the intersection of the sets of stable matchings of the different preference profiles is empty or not.
Theorem 11. For the joint probability model, ExistsCertainlyStableMatching is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in NP, since computing StabilityProbability can be done in polynomial time by Theorem 10. The NP-hardness proof is by reduction from 3-Colorability. Let G = (V, E) be a graph specifying an instance of 3-Colorability, where V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. We construct an instance I of SMULP assuming the joint probability model. For each vertex v i ∈ V , we introduce three men m i,1 , m i,2 , m i,3 and three women w i,1 , w i,2 , w i,3 . Then, we introduce one preference profile P 0 that ensures that every certainly stable matching matches-for each i ∈ [n]-each m i,j to some w i,j ′ and, vice versa, each w i,j to some m i,j ′ , for j, j ′ ∈ [3] . Moreover, it ensures that for each i ∈ [n], exactly one of three matchings between the men m i,j and the women w i,j must be used:
(1) mi,1 is matched to wi,1, mi,2 is matched to wi,2, and mi,3 is matched to wi,3; (2) mi,1 is matched to wi,2, mi,2 is matched to wi,3, and mi,3 is matched to wi,1; or (3) mi,1 is matched to wi,3, mi,2 is matched to wi,1, and mi,3 is matched to wi,2;
Intuitively, choosing one of the matchings (1)-(3) for the agents m i,j , w i,j corresponds to coloring vertex v i with one of the three colors in {1, 2, 3}. Then, for each edge e = {v i1 , v i2 } ∈ E, and for each color c ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we introduce a preference profile P e,c that ensures that in any certainly stable matching, the agents m i1,j , w i1,j and the agents m i2,j , w i2,j cannot both be matched to each other with matching (c). We let each preference profile appear with non-zero probability (e.g., we take a uniform lottery over all the preference profiles that we introduced). As a result, any certainly stable matching directly corresponds to a proper 3-coloring of G.
A detailed description of the preference profiles P 0 and P e,c and a proof of correctness for this reduction follows.
In P 0 , for each i ∈ [n], the preferences for m i,j , w i,j are as follows: Next, we continue with the preference profiles P e,c . Take an arbitrary e = {v i1 , v i2 } ∈ E and an arbitrary c ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In P e,c , the preferences for m i,j , w i,j for each i ∈ [n] \ {i 1 , i 2 } are exactly the same as in P 0 . Only the preferences for m i1,j , w i1,j and m i2,j , w i2,j differ from P 0 ; namely, we construct these preferences as follows.
For m i1,j , w i1,j , we start with preferences that (i) for all m i1,j have w i1,1 , w i1,2 , w i1,3 as top three choices, (ii) for all w i1,j have m i1,1 , m i1,2 , m i1,3 as top three choices, (iii) admit only matchings (1), (2) , and (3) as stable matchings between the agents m i1,j , w i1,j , and (iv) for the men m i1,j the matching (c) is the worst option among the matchings (1), (2) , and (3). Similarly, for m i2,j , w i2,j , we start with preferences that satisfy conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), and additionally satisfy the condition (iv ′ ) that for the women w i2,j the matching (c) is the worst option among the matchings (1), (2) , and (3). Then, we modify the preferences for m i1,1 and w i2,1 slightly. For m i1,1 , we insert w i2,1 between his second and third preferred woman. Similarly, for w i2,1 , we insert m i1,1 between her second and third preferred man. As a result, m i1,1 and w i2,1 form a blocking pair in this preference profile if both the agents m i1,j , w i1,j and the agents m i2,j , w i2,j are matched to each other using matching (c)-and not if either set of agents is matched to each other using some other matching (c ′ ).
such an edge coloring in polynomial time. Then, since in the proof of Theorem 11, in each preference profile P e,c with e = {v i1 , v i2 }, only the preferences for the agents m i1,j , w i1,j , m i2,j , w i2,j differ from P 0 , we can, for each color c ∈ {1, 2, 3}, combine the preference profiles P e,c for all edges e that are colored with the same color. This results in only 16 preference profiles: P 0 , and a preference profile for each of the 5 edge colors and each of the 3 vertex colors. ⊓ ⊔
Future work
First we note that we left open two outstanding questions, as described in Table  1 . In this paper we focused on the problem of computing a matching with the highest stability probability. However, a similarly reasonable goal could be to minimize the expected number of blocking pairs. It would also be interesting to investigate some further realistic probability models, such as the situation when the candidates are ranked according to some noisy scores (like the SAT scores in the US college admissions). This would be a special case of the joint probability model that may turn out to be easier to solve. Finally, in a follow-up paper we are planning to investigate another probabilistic model that is based on independent pairwise comparisons.
